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INTRODUCTION 
From 1 September 1939 Germany led a war of aggression against Poland, and two days 
later they were at war with France and Great Britain. The German Navy (Kriegsmarine), 
vigorously expanded from the year 1935 when the British-German Naval Treaty was 
concluded, also participated in the hostilities1. 
The submarines (Unterseeboote, U-Boote) constituted an important part of the Ger-
man Navy. The attacks of German submarines targeted primarily the British fleet, and 
during the war the German submariners were present in the most remote areas of the 
                                                 
1  Kaplan P., U-booty. Podwodna armia Hitlera, Warsaw 2015, p. 2. 
Abstract: 
The article concerns the theme related to the order of 17 September 1942 issued by Ad-
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connection with the rescue operation after the sinking of the British ship ‘Laconia’, which 
was commenced by the crew of a German submarine. Not only weighty military and ethi-
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world. The peak of their success in terms of tonnage sunk occurred in the months from 
July to November 1942 - it was the climactic phase of the “Battle of the Atlantic”2. 
In mid-August 1942, four German Type IX C submarines went out to sea from ports in 
the west of France3. They moved south towards the region of Cape Town. One of them 
was U-156 commanded by Captain Werner Hartenstein4. 
On the night of 12 September 1942, the U-156 carried out the surface attack and with 
two torpedoes sank the British ship Laconia, which during the War served as the auxil-
iary cruiser and the military transport vessel. Laconia was built at the beginning of 
1922 as an oceangoing passenger ship. Its displacement was of 19 680 GRT5. The ship 
sank at 505′ south latitude and 11 38′ west longitude, about 900 nautical miles south 
of Freetown. Laconia left Cape Town unescorted on 1 September 1942 with 2,725 
people on board, among whom there were 1,793 Italian prisoners of war, 286 British 
soldiers, 103 Polish soldiers and 80 civilians6. 
The attack on the Laconia was not a violation of international law, because the ship 
was armed with two 120 millimeters caliber guns and six anti-aircraft guns, sailed 
darkened and zigzagged, and, as such, was a natural target for a submarine7. 
The crew and passengers of the sunken ship saved themselves through evacuation into 
lifeboats or jumping into the water, where they were exposed to attacks of sharks. The 
German sailors heard a cry for help in Italian and commenced a rescue operation. A 
few minutes after midnight on 13 September 1942 Admiral Dönitz received a radio-
gram from Captain Hartenstein, the commander of the submarine. Its content read as 
follows: “Hartenstein. I sank the British Laconia, square FT 7721, 310 degrees, but with 
1500 Italian prisoners of war. 90 recovered so far. 157 m3, 19 torpedoes, Passat 3, 
awaiting orders”8. 
In response to the above message, Admiral Dönitz directed the U-506 and U-507 sub-
marines at the Laconia dumping site as they were closest to it, and asked the Italians 
for help and sending the Cappellini submarine operating in the same area. As pointed 
out in his memoirs, the rescue aid decision was not easy, because its conditions 
                                                 
2  Pertek J., Druga mała flota, Poznań 1983, p. 300. 
3  The Type IX C submarine was a large ocean vessel, designed to operate at large distances from their home port. Its 
displacement was of 1,120 tons on the surface and of 1,232 tons under water. The hull of vessels of this type was 76.8 m long 
and 6.8 m wide. The crew consisted of 4 officers and 44 sailors. Its operating depth was of 150 m and the maximum 
immersion depth of 225 meters. The range of the ship on the surface at the speed of 10 knots was 13,450 nautical miles 
offshore, while at the speed of 12 knots - 11,000 miles, and at the speed of 4 knots under water - 63 nautical miles, Kittel & 
Graf, History of the U-boot, 2015, pp. 101-102. 
4  Dönitz K., 10 lat i 20 dni. Wspomnienia z lat 1935-1945, Gdańsk 2004, p. 295. 
5  GRT - gross registered ton. For comparison, the displacement of the Polish passenger ship Batory was of 14 287 GRT and the 
famous Titanic of 46 329 GRT. 
6  Jarosz J., Brytyjskie krążowniki pomocnicze II wojny światowej, „Morza, statki i okręty” „Seas, ships and vessels”, No. 6/2005, 
p. 47. In contrast, in his memoirs Admiral Dönitz wrote that on board there were 436 crew members, 286 British 
holidaymakers with 80 women and children, 1800 Italian prisoners of war and 160 Polish guards, Dönitz K., op. cit., p. 296. 
More then 1000 people survived the distaster. Thoß H., Das Laconia-Ereignis: Korvettenkapitän Werner Hartenstein im 
Spannungsfeld von Gehorsam, Kriegsvölkerrecht und Moral; September 1942 - September 2012; wissenschaftliches 
Symposium; Tagungsband, Plauen 2012, p. 4. 
7  Blair C., Hitlera wojna U-bootów. Ścigani 1942-1945, Warsaw 1999, p. 89. 
8  Dönitz K., op. cit., p. 296. 
Konrad GRACZYK 
7 
threatened the destruction of the submarine as a result of an air attack. He did not 
change his decision despite the orders of Admiral Raeder, the Kriegsmarine General 
Commander, that submarines could not be exposed to danger during rescue opera-
tions, and of Hitler, that the operation of the submarines sent to Cape Town should 
not have been delayed and they could not be posed to any threat. Dönitz ordered the 
submarines to bring on board only such a number of shipwrecked people, which would 
retain their ability to dive9. 
The submarines alerted with an emergency call took part in the rescue operation. On 
13 September 1942 after 06.00 hrs, on his own initiative Capt. Hartenstein sent three 
open radiograms saying: “If Any ship will assist the ship-wrecked Laconia crew, I will 
not attack her providing I am not being attacked by ship or airforces. I picked up 193 
men, 452' South, 1126' West. German submarine”10. 
On 16 September 1942 at noon, during the rescue operation being carried out, an 
American bomber attacked the U-156, despite previous open messages and placing a 
large Red Cross flag on its conning tower. As a result, the submarine was damaged. A 
day later an attack was launched against the U-506 with 142 survivors on board. The 
dropped depth charges did not cause any damage, since she manage to draught at a 
safe depth. After the attack on U-156 and stormy deliberation, the German submarine 
fleet command decided to continue the rescue operation11.  
Due to the attack of the Allied air forces against German submarines conducting the 
rescue operation, on 17 September 1942 r Admiral Dönitz issued the “Laconia” order. 
1. THE CONTENT AND MOTIVES OF THE ORDER 
As acknowledged by Admiral Dönitz, as a result of the abovementioned incident he 
was forced to issue an order that would prevent it from happening again and would 
deprive vessels commanders of discretion, regardless of whether the danger of air 
strikes allowed to conduct a rescue operation or not. Experience with rescue opera-
tions resulted in the adoption of a model of conduct receiving the discretion of a sub-
marine commander at a spot. This model generally assumed withholding of any assis-
tance for survivors. The order read as follows: “No attempts should be taken to rescue 
crew members of sunken ships, recover swimming shipwrecked people, put them into 
lifeboats, lift overturned boats or give food and water. A rescue operation is opposed 
to the elementary principles of conducting the action to destroy enemy ships and 
crews. Orders related to taking the captains and chief engineers remain in force. Ship-
wrecked people are to be rescued only if their information could be relevant to your 
vessel. Be tough. Remember that the enemy also does not show consideration of your 
wives and children during the bombing raids on German cities”12. 
The commander of the German submarine fleet with the above order, so as to ensure 
the safety of their own vessels, introduced the principle of not providing assistance to 
                                                 
9 Ibidem, p. 299-300. 
10 Ibidem, p. 299, C. Blair, op. cit., p. 90-91. 
11 Dönitz K., op. cit., pp. 301-302. 
12 Quoted after: Pertek J., op. cit., p. 301-302. 
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crewmembers and passengers of sunken ships. He made no distinction between citi-
zens of the Allied and the Axis countries. Using the illustrative calculation of activities, 
he recommended not recovering survivors, not lifting overturned lifeboats and putting 
victims in them, as well as not providing them with food and drinking water. Giving the 
reasoning to his view he referred to the principles of conducting submarine warfare 
and its objectives, which was not only to destroy enemy vessels, but also their crews. 
However, he was not consistent in his assumption, as he mentioned two exceptions to 
the established rule. They included rescue officers in charge, i.e. a captain and the first 
mechanic, and those survivors who would have important information. Undoubtedly 
the rescue of those people could have a positive impact on the position of a subma-
rine, if they agreed to provide information on the activity of the fleet in a given region 
and even, in a wider strategic dimension, reveal technical issues related to their own 
weapons, tactics, etc. In fine Dönitz, aiming to break / overcome the moral standards 
of German officers referred to the bombing of German cities. The command to main-
tain a firm stance clearly demonstrates Admiral Dönitz’s awareness about a moral rep-
rehensible of the prohibition of aid to survivors and possible subordinates’ objections. 
The relation between the content of Laconia Befehl and orders previously issued by 
the command of the German Navy in terms of the conduct towards crewmembers of 
damaged vessels can be considered. The permanent (general) war order (Ständiger 
Kriegsbefehl) No. 154 was issued at the beginning of May 1940. Its fragment, quoted 
before the Nuremberg Court, read as follows: “Do not save or take any people. No 
concern over the steamer boats. [...] Just care about own ship and take any effort to 
quickly achieve subsequent success. In this war we have to be tough. The enemy 
launched the war to destroy us, this is not, therefore, anything more”13.  
In contrast, at the beginning of 1942, in an interview with the Japanese ambassador, 
Hitler pointed out that regardless of the number of ships under construction, the main 
problem of the USA is the lack of personnel. Therefore, he said that ships were to be 
sunk and their crews killed without warning, because the training of maritime person-
nel took a long time, and in such conditions it would be problematic to recruit new 
people. He had to give the order for submarines to surface and destroy lifeboats in the 
case when the enemy sailors could not be taken as prisoners14.  
The issue being analyzed corresponds to the content of the operation Atlantic order 
No. 56 (Atlantik Operationsbefehl), which was given later, on 7 October 1943, and 
highlighted the special task of destroying a rescue ship in each convoy. It was a special-
ist ship with a displacement of 3000 GRT, which was to bring survivors on board after 
the attacks of submarines; it was equipped with an aircraft and large motorboats. The 
Command identified the sinking of such a ship as crucial for the desired destruction of 
ships' crews15. Laconia Befehl did not substantially differ from the intention emerging 
                                                 
13 [online] [access: 18.09.2015] Available on the Internet http://www.zeno.org/Geschichte/M/Der+N%C3%BCrnberge 
+Proze%C3%9F/Hauptverhandlungen/Dreiunddrei%C3%9Figster+Tag.+Montag,+14.+Januar+1946/Vormittagssitzung, 
accessed on: 18.09.2015. 
14  Ibidem, accessed on: 18.09.2015. 
15  Ibidem, accessed on: 18.09.2015. 
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from other Hitler’s orders and views. It was about the destruction of the enemy crews, 
in order to lead to the paralysis of the enemy shipping, even when it had the relevant 
number of vessels. There is no point in questioning the Command’s power to impose a 
specific hierarchy of objectives. However, the guidelines of the Command with refer-
ence to the priority in the selection of targets of attack are something different from 
firing at survivors at sea. The wording of Laconia Befehl seems to be milder from the 
Hitler’s view that recommended the destruction of the boats with survivors on board. 
2. THE ACCUSATION OF ADMIRAL DÖNITZ 
The “Laconia” order was one of the circumstances justifying counts of alleged war 
crimes at sea. This charge was placed in the third chapter of the indictment, devoted 
to war crimes, where all the accused persons were accused of murder and abuse of 
prisoners of war and other members of the armed forces in the countries which Ger-
many led the war against, as well as people on the high seas16. Two other allegations 
against Admiral Dönitz concerned the participation in the preparation for the attack 
against Norway and turning the crew of the Allied torpedo boat over to the Security 
Forces of the NSDAP17. Generally, three charges against the German Admiral fell within 
the range of particular groups of criminal acts, including, firstly, the participation in the 
National Socialist conspiracy aiming to take power, as well as the preparation and wag-
ing the aggressive war, secondly, crimes against peace by taking part in the conduct of 
the aggressive war, and thirdly war crimes18. 
The author of the indictment when justifying the accusation stated19 that the defend-
ants murdered and mistreated prisoners of war through depriving them of the suffi-
cient amount of food, clothing, accommodation and medical care, forced them to work 
in inhuman conditions, and tortured, humiliated and killed them as well. Examples giv-
en by the prosecutor in support of the allegation included sending prisoners of war to 
concentration camps, murdering them at the time of their surrender on the battlefield, 
forcing prisoners to march at long distances without food, during which they died from 
exhaustion, using corporal punishment of non-commissioned officers and cadets who 
refused to work, and also poking privates with bayonets, beating them with rifle butts 
and flogging. The examples mentioned in this section of the indictment do not include 
any offense committed at sea or against survivors20. 
The literal interpretation of the order does not confirm the prosecutor’s conviction. 
The order issued by Admiral Dönitz prohibiting any actions bringing help, was the or-
der to refrain, not act. His hypothesis assumed refraining instead of operating actively. 
Having referred the content of Laconia Befehl to the allegation against the German 
                                                 
16  Cyprian T., Sawicki J., Materiały norymberskie: umowa, statut, akt oskarżenia, wyrok, radzieckie votum, Warszawa 1948, p. 93. 
17  Heydecker J., Leeb J., Trzecia Rzesza w świetle Norymbergi. Bilans tysiąca lat, Warsaw 1979, p. 425. 
18  Gelewski T., Zbrodnie wojenne na morzu w drugiej wojnie światowej, Gdańsk 1976, p.355. 
19  It should be emphasized that at this point of the indictment there was also posted a statement about 11000 Polish officers - 
prisoners of war murdered by the Germans in September 1941 in Katyn Forest near Smolensk, which - as we know - was not 
true, Cyprian T., Sawicki J., op. cit., p. 95. About the Katyn lie ,Cf. Graczyk K., Wyrok niemieckiego Trybunału Ludowego z 1943 
r. w sprawie kłamstwa katyńskiego, „Z Dziejów Prawa”, vol. 8(16), p. 13-25.  
20  Cyprian T., Sawicki J., op. cit., p. 93-94. 
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admiral it can be concluded that the prosecutor recognized the order prohibiting res-
cuing survivors as the order to murder them21. 
The thesis of the quoted order seemed to be giving relative priority to the military ac-
tion and security of the submarine22 in relation to the universal yet obligation to pro-
vide assistance. Relativity is the result of an exception allowed for captains, chief me-
chanics and people possessing important information 
However, it does not alter the fact that Laconia Befehl, even assuming its restrictive 
interpretation, was a morally reprehensible order. The ban on aid provided to survi-
vors was in fact the infringement against the rules governing the conduct of submarine 
warfare under international law - not only customs, but also concluded treaties, in par-
ticular the Protocol regulating the war operation of submarines set out in Part IV of the 
Treaty of London of 22 April 193023. This Protocol obliged submarines to comply with 
international law, which surface vessels were subject to. In accordance with the provi-
sions of the Protocol submarines were not allowed to sink an enemy ship without prior 
locating passengers, crew and ship's documentation in a safe place. Importantly, boats 
could not be considered as safe unless, depending on the sea state and weather condi-
tions, the safety of passengers and crew was ensured by the proximity of land or the 
presence of another vessel capable of providing assistance. 
When analyzing this specific order it must be borne in mind that the German Admiral 
issued it under the influence of events occurring after the sinking of the ship “Laconia” 
by the U-156, in particular after the Allied air forces had attacked the German subma-
rine, in spite of the apparent rescue operation, the flag of the Red Cross hung out and 
open information transmitted. It can be assumed that the German captain made every 
effort to safely coordinate and continue the rescue action. The Allied Command did 
not take this, however, into due consideration, because then the sinking of the Ger-
man submarine was more important than the fate of the survivors24. The Germans, 
unlike the Americans, behaved really humanely in this situation. 
The Admiral Dönitz’s order had generally preventive value - its aim was to avoid a 
threat to the German submarine. Such threat existed even when the submarine re-
mained on the surface during the day, and grossly increased in the case of its involve-
ment in emergency actions limiting the mobility of the ship. It should be added that 
this fear, both then and in the last months of the war, was justified. An armed aircraft 
was a monstrous threat to a submarine, if she did not have enough time to hide in the 
depths. Hence rightly the German Command recommended taking on board only the 
relevant number of people during rescue operations to maintain the capacity of alarm 
dive. Otherwise an aircraft attack could lead to the destruction of the entire vessel, 
and thus the death of survivors brought on board. The fairness of this position was also 
                                                 
21  Dönitz K., op. cit., p. 306. 
22  Heydecker J., Leeb J., , Trzecia Rzesza…, p. 423. 
23  Journal of Laws of 1937 No. 55 item 425. 
24  General Robert Richardson, who ordered the air attack on the German submarine conducting the rescue action after the 
sinking of ‘Laconia’, expressly confirmed the fact after the war. He said, among others, that it was a war so submarines had to 
be destroyed, and the presence of the survivors did not make any difference Dönitz K., op. cit., p. 305. 
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testified by the fate of three submarines taking part in the rescue operation of “Laco-
nia”, as all of them were destroyed along with the crews as a result of air strikes25. 
3. THE JUDGEMENT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL 
The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg was established by the so-called Lon-
don Agreement, that is “International agreements on the investigation and prosecu-
tion of the major war criminals of the European Axis”26, while its structure, the powers 
of the Tribunal and the principles governing taking of evidence were included in the 
card being the Annex to this Agreement. Taking of evidence during the Nuremberg trial 
was subject to several specific rules, essentially deteriorating the possibility to defend 
the accused. The exculpation was excluded by appointing to an official position, acting 
on behalf of the State or at the behest of the superior authority27. It was a very rea-
sonable position, since its absence in the extreme case (though unrealistic) would only 
allow a conviction of the Commander-in-Chief, namely Adolf Hitler, for a crime28. 
Furthermore, there was excluded the principle tu quoque (you too) including the ar-
gument related to the behavior of the other party, which would allow to absolve from 
guilt based on the fact of committing a similar act by the enemy29. In the absence of 
such a solution Germany could rely even on examples of bombing raids on German cit-
ies, for example Dresden. 
Admiral Karl Dönitz did not plead guilty. He was questioned about the fact of issuing 
Laconia Befehl, before the Tribunal there were quoted the content of this order, the 
content of the order of 7 October 1943 and the content of the permanent (general) 
war order No. 154; moreover, the conversation between Hitler and the Japanese dip-
lomat was reported, the example of opening fire at survivors on the order of Captain 
Eck was mentioned, and witnesses were interrogated – among others, Lieutenant Pe-
ter Heisig about the fact of the speech given by Admiral Dönitz at officers' school, con-
cerning the conduct of a total war at sea as well as the major problems of the United 
States with staffing new vessels30. 
In the prosecutor’s intention the introduction of the case of Laconia Befehl to the Nu-
remberg Court was to be the circumstance definitely aggravating Admiral Dönitz. 
However, it actually was an opportunity for the defense to prove that the crews of 
German submarines behaved in a humane manner, exposing themselves to danger, 
and that the Allies acted brutally attacking submarines conducting the rescue opera-
tion31. 
                                                 
25  Ibidem, p. 307. 
26  Journal of Laws 1947 No. 63 item 367. 
27  Gelewski T., op. cit., p. 351. 
28  In this issue it can be added that also the then German military penal code was on the basis of the so-called doctrine of 
intelligent bayonets, according to which a soldier was obliged to refuse to obey an order if it clearly aimed at committing a 
crime. Cyprian T., Sawicki J., op. cit., p. 28. 
29  Gelewski T., op. cit., p. 351. 
30  [online] [access: 05.10.2015] Available on the Internet: http://www.zeno.org/Geschichte/M/ Der+N%C3%BCrnberger+Proze 
%C3%9F/Hauptverhandlungen/Dreiunddrei%C3%9Figster+Tag.+Montag,+14.+Januar+1946/Vormittagssitzung. 
31  C. Blair, op. cit., p. 96. 
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It seems that defending efforts undertaken by Dr. Otto Kranzbühler, who was a judge 
of the German Navy, had a significant influence on the - favorable to the accused - as-
sessment of Laconia Befehl. Among others, he questioned one of the deputies of Dö-
nitz, Admiral Eberhard Godt, as a witness. This officer was involved in the formulation 
of the order being analyzed and stated that it had only meant to prohibit the conduct 
of any rescue actions32. Kranzbühler managed to get similar content orders of the Brit-
ish Admiralty on the unrestricted submarine warfare33. Kranzbühler undermined the 
prosecution’s witnesses’ testimonies and submitted statements of sixty-six command-
ers of German submarines for the benefit of Donitz34. The introduction into evidence, 
with the agreement of the Tribunal, a questionnaire developed by Kranzbühler, com-
pleted by the American Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Commander-in-Chief of the US 
fleet in the Pacific, was more crucial in effects and factually violated one of the rules of 
proceeding. Responses given by Nimitz evidenced that in the Pacific Ocean the Ameri-
can submarines attacked without warning, and no survivors were rescued if it exposed 
a submarine to danger or prevented further operation35. Especially the latter circum-
stance proved that Germany in the war at sea used the same methods toward England, 
as the USA toward Japan. The content of Admiral Dönitz’s order has been considered 
as an element of a total war36, which in conjunction with Admiral Nimitz’s testimony 
suggests that the Americans also conducted a total war against Japan. 
When referring to the presented evidence and statements, Admiral Dönitz condemned 
the criminal act of Captain Eck. He reasoned that the commanders of the submarines 
had to destroy floating wrecks - without killing sailors – so that they did not facilitate 
the pursuit of the U-boot37. However, with regard to shipwrecked people he said that 
fighting against them was a matter of soldier ethics in combat and it was unacceptable 
in any case38. 
The Tribunal in its judgment stated that the evidence presented did not provide abso-
lute certainty that Dönitz deliberately ordered the killing of survivors. He added, how-
ever, that orders were ambiguous and deserved the severest condemnation39. 
The Nuremberg Tribunal sentenced Admiral Karl Dönitz to ten years of imprisonment 
and was the lowest quantum of penalty ordered in the process. In conclusion, the 
Court ruled that he was considered guilty of the offenses covered by the second (i.e. a 
crime against peace) and the third (i.e. war crimes) parts of the indictment, while ac-
quitting him of the offenses covered by the first section (i.e. a conspiracy aimed at 
committing or leading to the commission of crimes against peace, war crimes and 
                                                 
32 [online] [access: 05.10.2015] Available on the Internet http://www.zeno.org/Geschichte/M/Der+ N%C3%BCrnberger +Proze 
%C3%9F/Hauptverhandlungen/Einhundertneunundzwanzigster+Tag.+Dienstag,+14.+Mai+1946/Nachmittagssitzung, accessed 
on: 05.10.2015.  
33  Heydecker J., Leeb J., Trzecia Rzesza…, p. 424. 
34  Blair C., op. cit., p. 726. 
35  Gelewski T., op. cit., s. 361. 
36  Bird K., Erich Raeder. Grossadmiral III Rzeszy, Warsaw 2009, p. 269. 
37  Kaplan P., op. cit., p. 230. 
38  Heydecker J., Leeb J., Proces w Norymberdze, Warsaw 2006, p. 331. 
39  Cyprian T., Sawicki J., op. cit., p. 308. 
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crimes against humanity) of that indictment40. The fact that the judgment was not 
based on an alleged breach of the international law on the conduct of submarine war-
fare41 indicates that the Nuremberg Tribunal did not recognize the Laconia Befehl as 
aggravating. The attributed perpetration of crimes against peace related to the partici-
pation in the preparation of the attack on Norway, while the perpetration of war 
crimes included turning the crewmembers of the Allied torpedo boat, who were then 
shot, over the Security Service of the NSDAP42. 
CONCLUSION 
The sinking of the ship “Laconia” was an example of one of the numerous activities 
carried out by the Germans during the unleashed by them World War II. The peculiari-
ty of this event was that the rescue operation was begun primarily due to the survivors 
who were allies of the Third Reich. The attack of the Allied aircrafts on the German 
ships engaged in the rescue operation was definitely unworthy. It showed, however, 
the degree of determination of the Allies towards German submarines. The order is-
sued on the ground of the rescue operation did not become the basis for finding Admi-
ral Dönitz guilty by the Nuremberg Tribunal, primarily because of its careful wording as 
well as similar orders of the British Admiralty on the unrestricted submarine warfare43. 
At the margin it may be stated that the issue of Laconia, including the order given by 
Donitz, is also an example of the historic policy pursued by Germany, the manifesta-
tions of which were the film “Laconia” and the miniseries “Sinking of Laconia” from 
2011. Opinions on the two works are divided. Among them critical views appear in re-
lation to opposing “the good German sailors with the Nazi Hartenstein at the fore-
front” to “the stupid and bad English officers and Polish soldiers guarding Italian pris-
oners of war”44. The film adaptations may in any case encourage the promotion of the 
own history in a way emphasizing its positives. 
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